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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). On January 6, 2009 this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No . 1: Is an insurance policy voidable by the policyholder when the 
insurer is not licensed by the department of insurance? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). The denial of a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be reversed only if no set of facts would 
support relief. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd„ 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
Issue No . 2: Does the Utah Insurance Code limit the original jurisdiction and 
power of a district court to rescind or avoid an insurance policy? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
Issue No . 3: Did the Car Dealers fail to "marshal all the record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding" under Appellate Rule 24 in their 
objections to class certification? 
Standard of Review: The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the procedure in 
this court "in all cases." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1(a). 
Issue N o . 4: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in certifying classes to 
resolve the disputes concerning the dealerships' Vehicle Theft 
Insurance policies? 
1 
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Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the 
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986). 
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are 
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). 
Issue N o . 5: D i d the trial court abuse its discretion in certifying c lasses to 
resolve the disputes concerning the dealerships' Guaranteed Auto 
Protection (GAP) insurance policies? 
Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the 
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986). 
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are 
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). 
Issue N o . 6: D i d the trial court abuse its discretion in certifying c lasses to 
resolve the disputes concerning the dealerships' D o c u m e n t a r y 
Service Fees ? 
Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the 
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986). 
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are 
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). 
III. D E T E R M I N A T I V E LAW 
The following Constitutional and statutory rules govern: Utah Constitution, Article 
VIII , Section 5; Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-101(2); Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105; Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-1-301 (163)(a); Utah Code Ann.§31A-2-309(l)(c); Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-102; 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-104(3)(a); Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-105; Utah Code Ann. 
2 
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§78A-5-102(l). These rules apply: Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. These cases apply: Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
616 (1997); Call v. City of West Tordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986); Surety Underwriters 
v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS RELIED ON BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION ON ALL CAUSES OF 
ACTION. 
The Policyholders/Car Buyers concur with Car Dealers' Statement of the case except 
their Statements of Fact. As described by the trial court in its July 30, 2008 Order, the court 
relied on tables of alleged facts produced by Plaintiff. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^[18, 
ROA 2158). In applying the Rule 23 analysis adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & jacquelin, supra, the trial court treated these facts as true. (Addendum A, Trial 
Court Order, f l 8 , ROA 2158). For this reason, Car Dealers' contrary facts are not relevant at 
this stage of the case. Many of the facts from the tables relied on by the trial court are 
described below: 
[Facts 1 through 9 are taken from the Table 1 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED AND 
AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA 
1838]. 
3 
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1. Plaintiffs are buyers of vehicles from Midway Auto Pla2a ("Midway") in 
Layton, Utah and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi ("Riddle") in Woods Cross, Utah. Support: Admitted 
in Answer to Second Amended Complaint. (KOA 1846). 
2. Plaintiffs alleged a variety of causes of action for fraud, violations of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act and other wrongs in their Complaint (filed on December 30, 
2004). Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Amended Complaint on June 1, 2005, seeking class 
status for three wrongs: Defendants ' charges for "Dealer Documentary Service Fees," 
Defendants ' "Vehicle Theft" policies, and Defendants ' "GAP Insurance" policies. Support: See 
pleadings on file. (KOA 1846). 
3. Plaintiffs' individual claims for fraud and other violations have been severed 
from this case as provided in the Stipulated Case Management Order entered on March 23, 
2006 and will proceed as separate cases. Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Second Amended 
Complaint on November 11, 2005 setting forth their class causes of action as described in the 
Stipulated Case Management Order. Support: See pleadings (KOA 1847, Class Action Second 
Amended Complaint KOA 183). 
4. The two dealerships are owned by separate entities created and controlled by 
Michael Riddle; they share c o m m o n management and policies. Support: Corporate document and 
other evidence will be produced at trial. (KOA 1847). 
5. Midway was opened by Mike Riddle in 2000. Mike Riddle opened Mike Riddle 
Mitsubishi in 2004. Both dealerships run used car businesses; Riddle also sells new cars. 
Support: Admitted in Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories, answer 1. (KOA 1847). 
4 
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6. Midway and Riddle are part of the small fraction of Utah dealers who finance 
their own sales by having the customers sign installment contracts payable to the dealer. 
Support: Both dealerships use installment sales contracts "on every deal." Deposition of Daniel LePelley 
(General Manager of Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi) at 18:7. (KOA 1848). 
7. Midway and Riddle finance virtually all of their used car sales by executing sales 
contracts between them and the car buyers. Support: Both dealerships use installment sales contracts 
"on every deal." Deposition of Daniel LePelley (General Manager of Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi) 
at 18:7. (KOA 1848). 
8. After the sale, Midway and Riddle sell and assign their contracts to other 
lenders, who collect the installment payments scheduled in the dealer installment contract. 
Support: All financing was made in this way with few exceptions. Deposition of Spencer Castle (General 
Manager of Midway), at 56:19. (KOA 1848). 
9. The evidence will show that Defendants target unsophisticated consumers -
often military people, young couples and people with little or poor credit. Support: Evidence of 
Defendants'marketing will be produced at trial. (KOA 1848). 
Facts alleged in Support of the Vehicle Theft Insurance Causes of Action 
[Facts 9 through 40 are taken from the Table 2 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED AND 
AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA 
1838]. 
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10. Defendants sell "Vehicle Theft" policies which pay up to $5,000 if the buyer's 
car is stolen. Support: See Vehicle Theft, policy attached as Exhibit "I" to P's Reply Memo to Certify 
Vehicle Theft Insurance claims. (ROA 1860). 
11. An important part of the sales pitch for these products is the promise of a 
monetary payment if the car is stolen. Support: Testimony given by David Griffiths and Jason Earl 
(Midway and Riddle Mitsubishi Finance Manager) attached to P's Reply Memo re Vehicle Theft Insurance. 
(ROA 1861). 
12. Defendants are licensed as limited lines insurance producers to sell credit 
insurance. Support: Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi; Utah Insurance Certificates, attached as 
Exhibits "J" and "K" to P's Reply Memo re: Gap Insurance. (ROA 1862). 
13. The Defendants are not licensed to sell property insurance or theft insurance. 
Support: Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi Utah Insurance Certificates, attached as Exhibits "J" and 
"K" to P's Reply Memo re: Gap Insurance. Also, testimony of Spencer Castle, former general manager of 
Midway. Castle Dep., 20:14;. testimony of Jason Earl, Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi finance 
manager. Earl Dep., 48:6-12. (ROA 1862). 
14. Defendants have sold two "theft-protection products" which they promise will 
deter car theft: Edge-guard and VTP. Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatories, Answer No. 7. 
ROA 1862). 
15. Both Midway and Riddle are authorized dealers for Edge-Guard warrantees on 
Etch. Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatories, Answer No. 7. (ROA 1862). 
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16. "Etch" refers to the etching of a small identification number on the windows 
of a car, which is promoted as a deterrent against theft. Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatory 
No. 8; David Griffiths Dep. at 40:17. (KOA 1863). 
17. Defendants etch the small numbers with acid on the windows of every car in 
their inventory before the purchaser comes onto the lot. Support: Defs1 Answers to Interrog. No. 
8. (KOA 1863). 
18. If the car buyer pays a premium of $299.95 for the guarantee policy, the etched 
number is registered with a database at an undisclosed location, and the car buyer is given a 
warranty policy. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories no. 8; Vehicle Theft policy attached as 
Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (KOA 1863). 
19. The promise of a "$2,500 & $5,000 Benefit Recovery Guarantee" if the car is 
stolen is the most prominent feature (in large, bold type) of the guarantee policy.( A copy is 
attached as Exhibit "A"). Support: Vehicle Theft policy attached as Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re: 
Vehicle Theft Insurance. (KOA 1863). 
20. The policy is silent as to who actually pays the benefit, but the dealer signs the 
policy. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories no. 8; Vehicle Theft policy attached as Exhibit "H" to 
P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864). 
21. Named Plaintiff Severo Rodriguez bought an Edge-Guard policy for $299.95 
from Midway Auto Plaza on June 1, 2004. Support: Rodrigue^ Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract, 
attached as Exhibit "L" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864). 
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22. Named Plaintiff Nicholas Rodarte bought an Edge-Guard policy for $299.95 
from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi on May 22, 2004. Support: Rodarte Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract, 
attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864). 
23. Midway sold a product called "VTP" in the years 2001 through 2003. Support: 
Answers to Defs' Interrogatories, Numbers, 6 and 7. (ROA 1864). 
24. "VTP" stands for "Vehicle Theft Protection," the name used on the product 
warranty policy for a starter interrupt which was intended to deter (not prevent) theft. Support: 
VTP policy attached as Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1865). 
25. Midway installed the starter-interrupts on certain types of cars in their inventory 
before the car buyers came to the lot. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogs., ans. 8. (ROA 1865). 
26. Car buyers who paid the premium of up to $3,500 were supposed to receive a 
key to activate the starter interrupt and a warranty policy promising money if the car was 
stolen. Support: Answers to Defs Interrogatories, 8; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "H;" 
Dalton Jaques, Motor Vehicle Sales Contract, attached as Exhibit "N;" both exhibits to P's 
Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (Plaintiff Dalton Jaques was charged $3,500 for 
VTP.) (ROA 1865). 
27. The "VTP" warranty policy promised "up to $1,500" if the car was stolen and 
not recovered. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories, no. 8; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit 
"H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1866). 
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28. Only the car dealer signed the policies. Support: Copy of VTPpolicy, attached as 
Exhibit "H"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit "0" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft 
Insurance. (ROA 1866). 
29. In the V T P policy, the benefit was to be paid by "VTP Vehicle Theft 
Protection," an unregistered d.b.a. of "Competitive Dealer Services," an unregistered d.b.a. 
of Michelle Davis of Bountiful, Utah. Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "M"; 
Depo. of Michelle Davis 4:24; both exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1867). 
30. Michelle Davis sells G A P insurance waivers and vehicle theft policies to car 
dealers in Utah. Support: Davis Dep., 8:8, exhibit to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. 
(ROA 1867). 
31 . Defendant Midway purchased the starter-interrupts and policy forms from 
Michelle Davis. Support: Davis Dep., 13:14; 14:25-15:2, exhibit to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft 
Insurance. (ROA 1867). 
32. Plaintiff Dal ton Jaques purchased a V T P policy for $3,500 from Midway Auto 
Plaza on August 9, 2004. Support: Dalton Jaques, Motor Vehicle Sales Contract, attached as Exhibit 
"M" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1868). 
33. Both Edge-Guard and V T P warranty policies contain the disclaimer, this "is 
not an insurance policy." Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard 
policy, attached as Exhibit "O" to P's Reply Memo re: VT insurance. (ROA 1868). 
34. The transfer of risk from the car owner coupled with the promise of monetary 
benefits are important and material parts of both "products." Support: Griffiths Dep., 
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42:21-43:8; Davis Dep., 42:15; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard 
policy, attached as Exhibit "O." All were exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: VT Insurance. (ROA 1869). 
35. Both the Edge-Guard and V T P policies provide monetary benefits 
supplementing the car buyer's own comprehensive auto insurance policy. Support: Copy of 
VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit "0." Both were 
exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1869). 
36. By tying the actual payout of benefits to the car owners deductible on his 
comprehensive auto policy, the creators of the Edge-Guard and V T P policies limit actual 
payouts to far less than the amounts advertised. (Deductible on comprehensive auto policies 
are much lower than the promised payouts of $5,000, $2,500 or $1,500 in these vehicle theft 
policies.) Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as 
Exhibit "O"; judicial notice. All were exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: VT Insurance. (ROA 1870). • 
37. Both the V T P and Edge-Guard policies contain claims provisions much more 
restrictive than those of qualified insurance policies. Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as 
Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit "O;" exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle 
Theft Insurance. Compare with Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-301-303 (claims), 
31A-21-203 (authorised clauses in insurance forms), and31A-21-312 (notices and proof of loss). (ROA 
1871). 
38. The promises of monetary benefits are made by companies or people who 
could never qualify as insurers in Utah, or in any other state. Support: The evidence at trial show 
that the insurers of these policies lack sufficient reserves and stability to qualify as insurers in Utah and all 
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other states, which require similar financial security. Defendants are not qualified in Utah to act as insurers. 
See Affidavit of Jack C. Helgesen with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit ,fN;" August 17, 
2007 letters from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, & Property Division of the Utah State Insurance 
Department, attached as Addendum D,R0A-1739-1742. (ROA 1872). 
39. Midway has sold more than 1,500 Vehicle Theft policies from 2000 through 
2006; more than 1,300 of these policies were for "VTP". Support: Defs Answers to Interrogatories, 
No. 6. (ROA 1873). 
40. Riddle has sold more than 1,150 Vehicle Theft policies from 2004 through 
2006; all of these policies were for Edge-Guard. Support: DefsAns to Interrogs, No. 6. (ROA 
1873). 
[Facts 41 through 44 are taken from the Table 1 A D D E N D U M T O P L A I N T I F F S ' R E P L Y 
M E M O R A N D U M IN S U P P O R T O F P L A I N T I F F S ' M O T I O N F O R C E R T I F I C A T I O N 
O F CLASS RE: V E H I C L E T H E F T P O L I C I E S , pp. 17-18. R O A 1464]. 
41 . The Utah Depar tment of Insurance regulates auto dealers' vehicle theft policies 
as insurance. Support: Letter from Brad Tippitts, Director of the Property and Casualty Division of the 
Utah Insurance Department, to Craig Bickmore of the Utah Automobile Dealers Association, these policies 
may not be offered <(unless an insurer with a certificate of authority to do business in Utah provides the 
provision for payment." (See September 9, 2005 letter from Utah Insurance Department, third paragraph, 
attached as Addendum E, ROA 1749). (ROA 1483). 
42. The Edge-Guard policies were not written by a qualified insurer. Support: As 
described in the policy, the apparent source ofpajments is "The Edge Program Administrator. <rThe Edge}) is 
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an assumed name of The Edge Financial Services, LLC., which is owned by David Griffiths. Mr. Griffiths, 
the person who sold the Edge-Guard policies to Defendants, identified the underwriter of the Edge-Guard 
policy as ''Dealers Motor Services out of New Jersey." (See Griffiths Dep., 44:19-45:2). (ROA 1480-
1481). 
43. Neither The Edge Program Administrator nor Dealers Motor Services is an 
insurance company authorized to do business in Utah. Support: List of Property <& Casualty, Life 
and Health Authorised Insurance Companies in Utah, ROA 1745). (ROA 1481). 
44. An insurance company is "behind" The Edge-Guard policies, but is not the 
underwriter and is not in privity with the policyholder. Support: David Griffiths testified that 
'Lloyds of London" is "behind" the Edge-Guard policy, but they are not the underwriter. (See Griffiths 
Dep., 44:19-45:2; 60:4). 'Lloyds of London" does not have even have the car buyer's name. (See Griffiths 
Dep., 60:4). (ROA 1481). 
Facts alleged in Support of the GAP Insurance Causes of Action 
[Facts 45 through 62 are taken from the Table 3 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED AND 
AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA 
1838]. 
45. When a car is totaled in an accident, GAP insurance will pay the remaining 
balance of the car loan (the "gap") after the owner's comprehensive insurance coverage has 
paid. Support: Spencer Castle Dep, 37:4. (ROA 1874). 
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46. G A P insurance is useful when the car buyer is "upside down" in a car, owing 
more than the car is worth. Support: DanielLePellej Dep., 43:13. (ROA 1874). 
41'. As sold by most lenders, G A P insurance is a three party agreement in which 
the car buyer purchases insurance underwritten by a commercial insurance company to pay 
the lender if the car is destroyed. Support: David Griffiths Dep., at 11 (this is "traditional" GAP 
insurance). (KOA 1874). 
48. Car buyers in Utah can purchase G A P insurance from banks, credit unions, 
finance companies, from the internet and from most large car dealers. Support: This testimony 
will be provided at trial. (KOA 1875). 
49. Defendants sell a modified version of G A P often referred to as a "GAP 
waiver." Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to 
Certify GAP. (KOA 1875). 
50. Defendants ' G A P waivers are two-party insurance contracts between the dealer 
and the car buyer. Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply 
Memo to Certify GAP. (ROA 1875). 
51 . The premium for Defendants ' "GAP waivers" is much higher than the car 
buyer would pay if he bought typical G A P insurance underwritten by a qualified insurance 
company. Support: Plaintiffs will produce this testimony at trial. Specific Objection: "Unsupported 
and inadmissible, speculative; conclusory, contains characterisations of counsel." (ROA 1876). 
52. The premium, usually between $500 and $600, buys forgiveness (waiver) of the 
balance owed under the installment sales contract if the car is destroyed. Support: Midway's 
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Answers to Interrogatories, Answer 5; Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi Answers to Interrogatories, Answer 5. 
(ROA 1876). 
53. Defendants sell the buyer an official looking policy providing for waiver, which 
is really an addendum to the installment sales contract. Support: Examples of GAP contracts, 
attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. (ROA 1876). 
54. In some of Defendants ' G A P waiver policies, a foreign business called Beacon 
Industries Worldwide, Inc. ("Beacon") assumes the risk of the loss of the car in the contract. 
Support: See Beacon GAP policy, attached as Exhibit "K" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. (ROA 
1877). 
55. In all other of Defendants G A P waiver policies not sold by Beacon, the 
Defendant dealerships assume the risk of the loss of the car as the principal in the insurance 
contract. Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to 
Certify GAP. (ROA 1877). 
56. These policies are written and sold to Defendants by agents for foreign 
companies who act as G A P "administrators" to receive claims and decide whether the dealer 
should accept or deny them. Support: See Exhibit "L" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. (ROA 
1878). 
57. If the "administrator" accepts the claim, the Dealer or its successor waives the 
balance owed on the installment sales contract after payment from the car owner's collision 
insurance. Support: See Exhibit "L" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. (ROA 1878). 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
58. Midway sold more than 1,500 GAP policies since opening in 2000; 328 of these 
policies were from Beacon. Support: Midway's Answers to Interrogs, Answer 5. (ROA 1879). 
59. Riddle has sold more than 1,140 GAP policies since opening in 2004; 346 of 
these policies were from Beacon. Support: Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi Answers to Interrogatories, 
Answer 5. (ROA 1879). 
60. Like most larger Utah motor vehicle dealers, Defendants are licensed as a 
"Limited Lines producers" to sell GAP insurance - but only if the policies are underwritten 
by qualified insurers and comply with Utah insurance laws. Support: See Defendants' insurance 
licenses, attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. "The commissioner will allow a 
dealer who has a limited lines license to sell insurance products for a licensed insurance company. The 
commissioner does not allow a dealer to act as an insurance company unless they are licensed as such. "August 
17, 2007 letter re: GAP Waiver Insurance from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, <& Property Division of 
the Utah State Insurance Dept., attached as Addendum D to this brief. (ROA 1880). 
61. The Defendants are not licensed as insurers in Utah. Support: See Defendants' 
insurance licenses, attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. Also: See Affidavit of 
Jack C. Helgesen with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit "N." August 17, 2007 letter re: GAP 
Waiver Insurance from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, & Property Division of the Utah State Insurance 
Department, attached as Addendum D). (ROA 1881). 
62. Beacon is not a licensed insurer in Utah. Support: See Affidavit of Jack C. Helgesen 
with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit "N. "August 17, 2007 letter re: GAP Waiver Insurance 
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from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, <& Property Division of the Utah State Insurance Department, 
attached as Addendum H, RAO 1739 to 1742. (ROA 1882). 
Facts alleged in Support of the Documentary Service Fee Causes of Action 
[Facts 63 through 89 are taken from the Table 3 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RENEWED AND 
AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA 
1838]. 
63. Each of the named Plaintiffs, who purchased a vehicle from Defendants' -
dealerships, was required to pay from $249.95 to $399.95 for a "Dealer Documentary Service 
Fee." The amount of the Documentary Service Fees, ("Documentary Fee") was the same at 
both dealerships. Support: See Defendants' Answers to Interrogs, answer 2. (ROA 1849, 1850). 
64. The Documentary Fee is a dealer imposed charge to reimburse the dealer for 
preparing the sales documents and for obtaining the license plates for the car buyer. This fee 
is not required by state or local law. Support: The first sentence was admitted in Defendant's Answer 
(to Second Amended Complaint), allegation. (ROA 1850). 
65. By state regulation, a "dealer documentary service fee" represents costs and 
profit to the dealer for preparing and processing documents and other services related to the 
sale or lease of (the) vehicle. These fees are not set or state mandated by state statute or rule." 
Support: Rule R877-23V-14 of the Utah Administrative Code. (ROA 1850). 
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66. At Midway and Riddle, the Documentary Fee is mostly additional profit to the 
dealer. Support:"...it's pure profit." Support: Deposition of Jason Earl, Midway Finance Manager, at 
29:11 and 33:23. (ROA 1850). 
67. The Documentary Fee is not discussed with the customer until after he or she 
agrees in writing to buy the car, as explained below. Support: Salesmen were not trained to discuss 
documentary fees with consumers. Deposition ofDaniel LePelley, Midway General Manager, at 27:5-28:2. 
Salesmen are not expected to know what a documentary fee is or to discuss it with consumers Deposition of 
Michael Dockery, salesman at both dealerships, at 16:1-17:3; also deposition of Deposition ofReid Teo , at 
50:12 . The finance manager discussed it with the customer in the finance office after the customer signed a 
commitment to buy the car. Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 16:23-17:2.; Depo. 
of Danny LePelley,General Manager of Midway,(the finance manager is the one who tells the consumer he 
can
ftbuy a car unless he pays the documentary fee), at 27:19. (ROA 1851). 
68. The sales process leading to the sale is the same at both dealerships. Support: 
Deposition ofReid Teo, salesman at both dealerships, at 36:25-37:4 ; also deposition of Michael Dockery, at 
11:11; 24:13; 27:4. (ROA 1851). 
69. All consumers who are serious about buying a car meet with a Midway or 
Riddle salesman in a small sales area, usually a small cubicle by the main sales area of the 
dealership. Support: Deposition ofReid Teo, salesman at both dealerships, at 45:1. See also Defendants' 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact 11, Memorandum in Opposition. (ROA 1852). 
70. The salesman encourages the consumer to sign a "proposal worksheet" 
containing the consumers offer to buy the car. Defendants ' salesmen refer to the proposal 
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worksheet as a "commitment" or a "foursquare." Support: Deposition of Michael Dockery, salesman, 
at 24:1. (KOA 1852). 
71. After the consumer signs the commitment , the salesman takes it to a manager 
who will make a handwritten counteroffer on the back side of the commitment form. At 
Midway and Riddle, the manager's offer is referred to as a "pencil." Support: See copy of the 
manager's "pencil11 offer, attached as Addendum L to this brief (KOA 1853). 
72. The pencil offer from the manager includes the purchase price of the car 
followed by the notation "+ T&L." "T & L" refers to tax and license charges. Support: See 
copy of the manager1 s "pencil" offer, attached as Exhibit "B". Managers counter offers, which are part of the 
sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and license," 
and have never included a mention of the" term doc fees or anything like that." Depo. ofDaniel LePelley 
Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (KOA 1853). 
73. For consumers who buy a car, the negotiations continue until the manager 
makes a pencil offer the consumer accepts. The consumer then signs the manager's written 
offer agreeing to buy the car for the price and terms described. Support: Depo. of Michael 
Dockery, salesman, at 25:17, 26:22; Also depo. ofKeidTeo, salesman at both dealerships, at 41:19-42:14 
(Dealerships treated the car as sold when the consumer signed the pencil). (KOA 1853). 
74. After the consumer signs the commitment to buy the car, the salesman assists 
the car buyer with a basic credit application (if needed) and other information required to 
complete the printed documents . Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 
16:25; Deposition of Michael Dockery, salesman, at 29:8. (KOA 1853). 
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75. The car buyer is then taken to a finance office to meet and sign the formal 
documents. Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 16:23-17:2; (See a 
more complete discussion in support of ¥ act 17, above). (ROA 1854). 
76. The Documentary Fee is not included or mentioned in the offers and 
counteroffers between the consumer and the manager. Support: Manager's counter offers, which are 
part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and 
license", and have never included a mention of the" term doc fees or anything like that." Depo. of Daniel 
LePelley, Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (See support for Fact 17, above). (ROA 1854). 
11. In the finance office, the finance manager presents the car buyer with the 
formal Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. Support: Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact 
17, Memorandum in Opposition. Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 17:18-18:2. 
(ROA 1854). 
78. On line 27 of Defendants' Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale is a preprinted 
charge for Dealer Documentary Service Fees, currently $399.95. Support: Admitted by 
Defendants in their Answer (to Second Amended Class Action Complaint), fact 96; Midway's Answer to 
Interrogatories, Answer 2; and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 2. 
See copy of a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale attached as Addendum K to this brief. (ROA 1855). 
79. The Documentary Fee increases the price of the car above the charges agreed 
to in the signed pencil agreement between the dealer and consumer. Support: Manager's counter 
offers, which are part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific 
price "plus tax and license," and have never included a mention of the"term doc fees or anything like that." 
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Deposition ofDaniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (See support for Fact 22, above). (KOA 
1856). 
80. If the car buyer objects to the Documentary Fee, the dealership tells him the 
charge is required for everyone. Support: Deposition of Daniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at 
27:12-24 ("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a car"). (KOA 1856). 
81. Defendants will not sell a car for the price agreed to in the signed pencil 
agreement. Support: Manager's counter offers, which are part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment" 
process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and license," and have never included a mention of 
the" term doc fees or anything like that." Deposition ofDaniel LePelley Midway General Manager, at 29:5. 
(See support for Facts 22 and 31 above) and at 27:12-24 ("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a 
car"). (KOA 1857). 
82. Defendants claim to have small 5" x 6M or 6" x 6" signs posted on the walls of 
its finance offices explaining the Documentary Fee. Support: Deposition of Jason Earl, Finance 
Manager at Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, at 34:9, 39:9. (KOA 1857). 
83. Only consumers who have agreed to purchase a vehicle are taken into the 
finance office. Support: Consumers went into the finance area only after they had completed the 
preliminary paperwork for the sale. Depo. of] as on Earl, Finance Mgr. at Midway and Mike Kiddle 
Mitsubishi, at 35:21-36:2; Depo. of Spencer Castle, Midway General Mgr., at 17:18. (KOA 1857). 
84. Documentary Fee signs are not posted in the sales areas or anywhere else 
except the finance offices. Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 
46:20-47:40. Some witnesses say there is a small sign on the wall in a walkway back to the vehicle service 
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area at Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, but no signs have been in the sales areas where the car sales are negotiated. 
Deposition of Jason Earl, Finance Manager at Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, at 35:8-41:10. 
(KOA 1858). 
85. None of the named Plaintiffs can recall seeing a Documentary Fee sign. 
Support: Jaques Dep., 83:16; DellaGar^a Dep., 81:12; HeinerDep., 59:14; Holbrook Dep., 51:15; 
Nielson Dep., 82:7; and Rodriguez Dep., 56:15. (KOA 1858). 
86. The Defendant Dealerships have charged a Dealer Documentary Service Fee 
to every purchaser and lessee of a motor vehicle at their dealerships for all time periods 
relevant to this action. Support: Deposition of Daniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at 27:12-24 
("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a car"). (KOA 1858). 
87. Midway charged $249.00 for Documentary Fees from 2000 through January 
31, 2002; $289.95 until September 19, 2003; $299.95 until August 20, 2004; and $399.95 to 
the present. Since its opening in February, 2004, Riddle has charged the same as Midway for 
Documentary Fees. Support: Midway's Answer to Interrogatories, answer 2; Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi's 
Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 2. (KOA 1859). 
88. Midway sold 315 vehicles in 2000, 399 in 2001, 816 in 2002, 857 in 2003, 714 
in 2004, 668 in 2005, and 493 in 2006. Support: Midway's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 1. 
(KOA 1859). 
89. Riddle sold 759 vehicles in 2004, 919 in 2005, and 572 in 2006. Support: Mike 
Riddle Mitsubishi's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 1. (ROA 1859). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
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The trial court properly denied the Car Dealers ' motion to dismiss the insurance 
causes of action for failing to state a claim under Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105(2) because its 
plain meaning makes contracts by unlicensed insurers voidable by the policyholder. The trial 
court correctly ruled that each "policyholder may avoid the contract." IcL 
The Car Dealers have cited to the statute but they have not addressed its meaning. 
The Car Dealers ' argument that an insurance contract with an unauthorized insurer 
can be avoided only through an administrative process is contrary to the plain wording of the 
statute which describes the procedure: "The policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to 
the insurer." IcL The legislative history of §31 A-15-105(2) is unnecessary to explain its plain 
words and does not support the Car Dealers ' view of the statute. 
The Car Dealers ' idea that Utah courts lack jurisdiction to avoid an insurance contract 
with an unauthorized insurer begins with this faulty premise: "the power of enforcement for 
any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the insurance commissioner." 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 23) Court jurisdiction is presumed, and is supported by the wording of 
§31A-15-105, the insurance code and chapter 15, which purposes to "subject unauthorized 
insurers. . .to the jurisdiction of. . .courts." Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-101(2). See Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-1-105 (unauthorized insurers are subject to "the jurisdiction of. . .the courts of 
this state.") Case law supports the courts ' role in applying the insurance code to insurance 
contract disputes, and nothing in the Insurance Code injects the commissioner into contract 
disputes between parties to insurance policies. The Utah Supreme Court applied the 
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substantive rules of Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105 to resolve a policy dispute in Surety 
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). 
In challenging class certification, the Car Dealers have argued their own set of facts 
and have not met their duty under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
marshal the record evidence relied on by the trial court. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in certifying class actions on the insurance (VTP and GAP) and the documentary 
fee (Doc Fees) causes of action. In applying Rule 23, the court is required to accept the 
substantive allegations of the complaint as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 
177-78 (1974). The Policyholders have alleged that none of the insurers in the Car Dealers ' 
vehicle theft policies and G A P policies are licensed in Utah law, and that all of the vehicle 
theft policies are unlawful for other reasons. O n the issue of D o c Fees, the Car Buyers 
complain that the Car Dealers ' practice in every sale commits car buyers to a contract price 
before the Dealer gives notice of their $399.95 mandatory charge for document preparation. 
Every sale violates Utah law. The trial court correctly found "the issues are not so complicated 
as argued by the defendants" (Addendum A, \ 36), and that individual variations in sales do 
not matter in resolving the Policyholders ' /Car Buyers' legal issues. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding "each of the claims presented by 
the members of the proposed classes is so small on its own that it would not be worthwhile 
for those individuals to bring their own claims in separate, individual lawsuits." (Addendum 
A, f 68). This is the "policy at the very core of the class action mechanism." Amchem 
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Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997). It also follows the Utah Supreme 
Court's approval of class actions to allow "access to the courts for numerous claimants to 
request redress of claims that are too small to merit the expenses of litigation on an individual 
basis." Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). In this case, a class action 
is the only method for change and redress of the wrongs by these Car Dealers. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY D E N I E D T H E CAR DEALERS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
1. REVERSAL OF T H E MOTION TO DISMISS WOULD BE IMPROPER 
BECAUSE T H E CAR DEALERS HAVE N O T CHALLENGED T H E 
OTHER INSURANCE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS APPEAL. 
In their appeal of the trial Court's denial of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class 
Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies, the Car Dealers limit the 
scope of the issues to a review of the Policyholders' cause of action under Utah Code Ann. 
§31 A-l 5-105 of the insurance code. (Appellants' brief, Statement of the Issues, p. 1). They 
did not argue for dismissal of the contract rescission causes of action in the trial court, and 
the trial court's ruling did not address them. See Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
839 P.2d 798, 806 (Utah 1992)("we necessarily retain authority to invalidate insurance 
provisions that are found contrary to public policy as expressed in the common law of 
contracts"); Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 931 (Utah 2002). 
2. T H E POLICYHOLDERS HAVE STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO 
AVOID THEIR INSURANCE CONTRACTS AS DESCRIBED IN §31A-15-
105 OF T H E INSURANCE CODE. 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[Response to the Car Dealers' argument that an insurance policy is voidable only by the 
Insurance Commissioner; that policyholders have no private right of action. (Brief, pp. 23-
35.)]. 
A. Plaintiffs have stated proper causes of action for avoidance of contract 
under Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105. 
1. Unlicensed insurers 
Chapter 15 of the Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l 5-101 et. seq., 
defines the legal treatment of Unauthorized Insurers. In the Insurance Code, an 
"unauthorized insurer" is defined as an unlicensed insurer. Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l-301 
(163)(a). 
Policyholders allege that none of the insurers in the Car Dealer's Vehicle Theft 
insurance contracts and GAP insurance contracts are licensed in Utah. (Statement of Facts 
No. 38, 42, 43, 61, and 62). This fact should be taken as true in an appeal from denial of a 
motion to dismiss. Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Utah App. 1996). 
2. Car Dealers' Violations of Chapter 15 
In selling their Vehicle Theft and GAP insurance contracts, the Car Dealers violated 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l5-102(1) which prohibits "any act" by a person "who knows or 
should know the act may assist in the placement of insurance with an unauthorized insurer." 
Such acts are punishable as a third degree felony. IcL §31 A-l5-102(5). The Car Dealers and 
their insurance salesmen are licensed Utah insurance agents who are presumed to know the 
laws pertaining to their license. Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323, 324 (Utah 1979). They 
should know the insurers in the contracts they sell are not licensed. 
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The Car Dealers ' Vehicle Theft insurance contracts also violate Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-15-104, which reads: "Any insurance on personal property sold.. under a ... security agreement... 
which charges the buyer, as part of the consideration in the agreement of sale for insurance on the property, 
shall be placed with an insurer authorised to do business in Utah." (emphasis added). 
3. Contracts are voidable w h e n the insurer is unauthorized 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A- l 5-105 provides the remedy for violations of Chapter 15. 
§31A-15-105. Effect of Contracts illegal because insurer was 
unauthorized. 
(1) A contract entered into in violation of this chapter is unenforceable 
by, but enforceable against the insurer. ... 
(2) An insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is 
voidable by the policyholder who entered into the transaction without 
knowing it was illegal. The policyholder may avoid the contract by 
notice to the insurer, if no insured has enforced the contract by an 
action under Subsection (1), and may recover any consideration paid 
under the contract. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 (1986)(Addendum C). 
B. T h e Car Dealers have not d i scussed the plain language of §31A-15-105. 
[Response to the Car Dealers ' argument that an insurance policy is voidable only by the 
Insurance Commissioner; that policyholders have no private right of action; that Appellees 
have failed to cite any express statutory authority for their remedy (Brief, pp . 23-35.)]. 
"Under our established rules of statutory construction, we look first to the plain 
meaning of the pertinent language in interpreting a statute; only if the language is ambiguous 
do we consider other sources for its meaning." Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm'n , 
2006 U T 58, 147 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Utah 2006). 
1. Car Dealers ' View of the Statute 
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Surprisingly, the Car Dealers referenced Utah Code §31A-15-105 five times in their 
argument (Appellant's Brief, pp . 24, 25, 26, 27 and 30) without ever explaining what they 
believe it means. 
2. T h e Pol icyholders' View of the Statute 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 gives policyholders an express contract remedy to 
avoid insurance contracts with unauthorized (unlicensed) insurers. The plain language of the 
statute refutes Car Dealers ' arguments. 
Question: W h o may avoid the contract? The Car Dealers say that only the 
Commissioner can avoid the contract (Appellants' Brief, pp . 23 , 24, 27, 30). The statute says: 
"An insurance policy. . .is voidable by the policyholder. . .The policyholder may avoid the contract/''Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-15-105(2) (emphasis added). 
Question: H o w is avoidance accomplished? The Car Dealers say the contract can 
be avoided only through an administrative process with the Insurance Commission. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp . 30-31.) The statute says: "The policyholder may avoid the contract by 
notice to the insured." IcL 
Question: Who may recover the consideration paid? The Car Dealers say the 
Commissioner must recover the consideration for the policyholders. (Appellants' brief, p . 30). 
The statute says: "The policyholder... may recover the consideration paid under the contract." Id. 
The statute is plain and unambiguous in giving the policyholder the remedy. 
C. Legislative history: Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 c h a n g e d the 
substantive law of insurance contracts and adopted the c o m m o n law 
remedy for a voidable contract. 
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[Response to the Car dealers' argument that "nothing in the history suggests that the 
language of the previous act... was altered to provide a new private right of action for 
individuals..." (Brief, p. 29.)]. 
1. Chapter 15 of the Utah Insurance Code subjects un l i censed 
insurers to the jurisdiction of Utah courts because it incorporates two 
prior Acts , one of w h i c h expressly required court jurisdiction. 
Utah, like most states, has a history of imposing various sanctions on unlicensed 
insurers doing business in the state. See: Couch on Insurance 3d §§ 3:39-3:40 (1999). Before 
the 1984 insurance code revision, those sanctions were found in two Acts: The 
"Unauthorized Insurers Act," Utah Code Ann. §31-38-1, et. seq.(1963)(repealed 1985), 
Appellants ' Addendum C; and the "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act," Utah Code Ann. 
§31-35-l(1963)(repealed 1985), Addendum M to this brief. 
a). The Car Dealers have discussed the prior Utah Code Ann. §31-38-1. The Car 
Dealers have discussed the prior "Unauthorized Insurers Act," Code Ann. §31-38-1, et. 
seq.(1963)(repealed 1985) which gave the commissioner authority to file a Complaint for 
injunctive relief in district against an unlicensed insurer and appointed the Secretary of State 
as the agent to receive process in lawsuits filed by the state. Former §§31-38-4 and 5. The 
Act had the purpose of subjecting unlicensed insurers "to the jurisdiction of the insurance 
commissioner and the courts of this state in suits brought by or on behalf of the 
state,"(Appellants argue this describes the entire purpose of the current act). (Appellants' 
Brief, pp . 28-29). 
b). The Car Dealers have N O T discussed the prior Utah Code Ann. §31-35-1. 
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The "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act," Utah Code Ann.(1963)(repealed 1985), 
Addendum M, had the express purpose of making unlicensed insurers "subject... to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state in suits brought by or on behalf of insureds or 
beneficiaries under insurance contracts." §31-35-2 (1963)(emphasis added). That Act: 1) 
appointed the commissioner to receive process in lawsuits filed by policyholders (§31-35-2); 
2) required an unlicensed insurer to obtain a certificate of authority (license) before filing a 
pleading in a lawsuit filed against it by a policyholder (§31-35-4); and 3) provided for an 
award of attorneys fees in policyholder lawsuits on the contract (§31-35-5). 
c). The current Unauthorized Insurers Act combined the two prior acts and 
expanded its purpose. In 1985, the authority of the commissioner and the sanctions against 
unlicensed insurers in privately filed lawsuits were combined into the new Chapter 15, the 
Utah "Unauthorized Insurers Act." The former §§31-38-4 (lawsuits by the commissioner) 
became the current §31 A-15-211. The former §§31-35-2, 4 and 5 (lawsuits by policyholders) 
were combined into the current §31A-15-102(4), 107 and 108. The purpose of the newly 
combined act is "to subject unauthorized insurers... to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
commiss ioner and the courts." Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1 5-101(2)(emphasis added). 
2. T h e 1985 act repealed the prior treatment of contracts by 
unauthorized insurers. 
The immediate ancestor of the current §31A-15-105 was §31-38-3(3)(a) which read, 
"The failure of an insurer transacting insurance business in this state to obtain a certificate of authority shall 
not impair the validity of any act or contract of such insurer?" §31-38-3(3)(a)(repealed in 1985 and 
replaced by §31A-15-105)(emphasis added). 
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3. Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 declares contracts by unauthorized 
insurers to be V O I D A B L E ; all other provisions of the statute flow 
from that substantive change of law. 
"An insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is voidable by the policyholder..." 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 (emphasis added). 
Under c o m m o n law, a "voidable contract" is "a contract that can be affirmed or 
rejected by one of the parties; a contract that is void as to the party wronged, unless that party 
elects to treat it as void." Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 350, (8th ed., 2004)(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 affirms this traditional judicial treatment of voidable contracts. 
Noth ing in this statute differs from the c o m m o n law treatment of voidable contracts. 
D . T h e statute enables an express contract remedy. It does not invoke the 
pol icy considerat ions of an "implied right of act ion" analysis. 
[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the Utah courts have never found an 
implied private right of action in the Insurance Code. (pp.32-34)]. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 is substantive and expressly 
remedial . 
It would be difficult to write with plainer meaning than"the policyholder may avoid 
the contract. . ." §31A-15-105(2). 
2. An "implied right of act ion" analysis is unnecessary . 
Car Dealers avoid the plain language of §31 A-l5-105(2). They say, "Because the Utah 
Insurance Code does not expressly provide for any private right of action, only an "implied" 
private right, if any, could exist." (Appellants' Brief, p. 32). They cite (Appellants' Brief, pp . 
32-33) three Utah insurance cases to prove, "in the absence of statutory language expressly 
indicating a legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts are reluctant to 
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recognize an implied right." Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342, 348 
(Utah 2005). The other two cases are Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, 436 (Utah 
2006) and Cannon v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 994 P.2d 824,828-29 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
These three cases do not apply because for the following reasons: 
a. An "implied right analysis" is a search for a tort remedy in a statute. Policyholders 
are not doing that. 
b. An "implied right analysis" does not apply to a plain remedy. 
Machan and Cannon (Saleh follows Machan) searched for an "implied right" only 
because the plain language of the insurance claims practices statute does not give any right to 
the policyholder. Machan, at 116 P.3d 348; Cannon, at 994 P.2d 828. In fact, the code 
section applied in both cases states "this section does not create any private cause of action." 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-303(5)(1999); Machan at 116 P.3d 348, Cannon at 994 P.2d 828. 
As the trial court noted, "the cases cited appear to be focused on other portions of the 
Insurance Code that are not the basis of the plaintiffs' claims in this case. In reviewing the 
motion to dismiss, the Court must look to the section of the Utah Insurance Code that is the 
basis of the plaintiffs' claims..." July 30, 2008 Order on Ruling on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and Gap Insurance Policies, % 22, 
emphasis added. The plain words of §31 A-l 5-105(2) give the policyholder an express 
remedy: "an insurance policy. . .is voidable by the policyholder. . .the policyholder may avoid 
the contract." 
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If the Car Dealers applied the four-part "Cort test" used by the Machan court in their 
search for an implied right, they would concede the express language of §31A-15-105(2) 
easily passes the test. 
3. Even without a private right of action, the court should enforce 
§31A-15-105. 
"Even in the absence of a private right of action under section 31A-26-301, we would deem it proper 
for a court to take into account the legislature s mandates..." Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
116 P.3d at 349, emphasis added. 
E. COURT JURISDICTION: SEVEN REASONS UTAH COURTS 
HAVE JURISDICTION A N D POWER TO ENFORCE §31A-15-105. 
[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the 
power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the 
insurance commissioner" and the policy holders have failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedy. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23, 24, 25, 27, 30—35, quote from p. 23)]. 
Reason 1: Court jurisdiction is presumed. 
"The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-5-102(l). "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs." Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. 
The legislature's choice of forum in §31a-l 5-105 is not determined by the absence of 
the word "court," but by the absence of plain language to the contrary. 
Reason 2: The plain language of the statute describes court action. 
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To support their view that "the Insurance Code does not authorize courts to 
determine Insurance Code violations" (Appellants' Brief, p. 24), the Car Dealers look 
everywhere in the Insurance Code except in the statute itself. 
The Car Dealers' begin with a faulty premise: "The power of enforcement for any 
alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the Insurance Commissioner," a 
conclusion they reach from reading the "whole Insurance Code" to avoid being misled by 
§31A-15-105(2). (Appellants' Brief, pp. 24, 27). 
The "best evidence" of the meaning of a statute is the plain language of the statute 
itself. Tcnsen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). Utah Code 
Ann. §31 A-15-105 has three parts. The court should harmonize "provisions within the same 
statute." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Company, 70 P.3d 1, 8 (Utah 2003). -
The avoidance remedy belongs to the policyholder, not to the Commissioner or 
to the courts. "The policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to the insured." Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-15-105(2). If the insurer refuses to return the consideration, court 
enforcement is implied. The insurance commissioner has no statutory role in insurance 
contract disputes. 
Sub-part (1) describes court enforcement. "An insurance contract entered into in 
violation of this chapter is unenforceable by, but enforceable against, the insurer. In an 
action against the insurer on the contract. . ." Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105(1). 
Sub-part (2) implies court enforcement. The plain language of §31 A-15-105(2) 
states "The policyholder may avoid the contract. . ." implies the traditional forum for contract 
litigation — the courts. 
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Subpart (3) describes court enforcement . Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l5-105(3) makes 
a person who assisted an unlicensed insurer "liable to the insured for the. . .claim or loss. . . .if 
the insurer does not pay it." A court appointed receiver can assert the claims of insureds in a 
delinquency action against insolvent insurers under chapter 27a (formerly 27) of the 
Insurance Code. 
A delinquency action (liquidation of an insurer) is not an administrative remedy - it is 
a court action. 
Reason 3: T h e Insurance Code expressly subjects un l i censed insurers to 
court jurisdiction and appoints the Commiss ioner to receive 
process . 
[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the 
power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the 
insurance commissioner,"and "Appellees have failed to cite any express statutory authority 
permitting them to bring such claims."(Brief, pp. 23 and 33.)]. 
a. Invoking court jurisdiction over un l i censed insurers is an express 
purpose of the chapter at i s sue . 
The purpose of chapter 15 of the Insurance Code, which includes the section upon 
which these Policyholders rely, is to subject unauthorized insurers "to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
commissioner and courts." Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-101 (1985). (Emphasis added by the trial 
court in Addendum A page 13, *\ 23, the Order from which this appeal is taken.) 
b. Court jurisdiction over un l i censed insurers is specifically within the 
scope of the Insurance Code. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105 in Part 1, "The Purposes, Scope and Application," of the 
Insurance Code states that any person who assists an unauthorized insurer in ways prohibited 
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by §31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), as is alleged by the Policyholders in this case, is "subject to 
the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this state under Sections 31A-2-309 and 
31A-2-310 to the extent of that coverage or activity." (emphasis added). The last two referenced 
sections provide for civil process on unauthorized insurers. 
c. T h e C o m m i s s i o n e r is t h e s t a tu to ry a g e n t for p r iva te l awsu i t s aga in s t 
u n a u t h o r i z e d i n s u r e r s . 
Court jurisdiction over unauthorized insurers and anyone assisting them is enabled by 
appointing "the commissioner or the lieutenant governor as agent for service of process 
under jf31A-2-309 and J31A-2-310." Utah Code Ann. J31A-15-102(4). The same 
appointment is made by reference in Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105. 
Subsection 31 A-2-309(l) appoints the Commissioner as the agent for the defendant, 
"or the lieutenant governor when the subject proceeding is brought by the state." 
If the Commissioner is the only possible plaintiff, as the Car Dealers ' argue, 
(Appellants' brief, p . 30) why would the legislature designate the commissioner as the 
statutory agent for the defendant? 
Reason 4: In Surety Underwr i t er s , the Utah S u p r e m e Court appl ied 
§31A-15-105 as substant ive law in a contract d i spute . 
[Response to the Car Dealers ' incorrect statement that the "district court acknowledged its 
ruling was thinly supported" and "the Court admitted it had "misapplied" the analysis of 
Surety Underwriters."(Appellants ' Brief, pp . 25 and 26)]. 
The Car Dealers ' argument that §31A-15-105 establishes "a limited right meant to be 
enforced through the insurance depar tment" is contrary to the Supreme Court 's application 
of the statute in Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). 
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There, Certified Surety Group , an insurance company licensed in California, had paid claims 
on a surety bond covering defendants ' trucking business. Certified, one of the plaintiffs, sued 
to collect on defendants ' indemnity agreement signed in connection with the surety bond. 
The defendants raised §31 A- l 5-105(1) as an affirmative defense, arguing that the indemnity 
agreement was part of an insurance arrangement and that the insurance contract was 
unenforceable under the statute. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment 
because Certified was not licensed as an insurer in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court, ruling that §31 A-l5-105(1) made the contracts unenforceable. IcL at 345-46. 
Car Dealers ' object ion to Surety Underwriters misappl ies its holding. The Car 
Dealers in this case argue (at Appellants ' Brief, p. 25) the Surety Underwriters opinion was 
misapplied by the trial court (in its order denying their motion to dismiss the insurance 
claims) because it described the defendants as seeking relief. The trial court reasoned, "If an 
individual has a right to seek relief from the courts under subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-15-105, it is reasonable that an individual would also be able to seek relief from the 
courts under subsection (2) of the statute." (Addendum A, ^ 24, R O A 2160 and 2161). In its 
ruling on the Car Dealers ' Motion to Reconsider, the trial court corrected its statement by 
noting that the Surety court had not applied §31A-15-105 to find a cause of action, but to 
find a valid affirmative defense. (Addendum B, R O A 2193). 
Car Dealers apparently believe §31 A-l5-105(1) should be applied differently to 
plaintiffs than to defendants - illegal insurance contracts are "unenforceable by. . .the 
insurer" only when the insurer is the plaintiff but are fully enforceable by the insurer when 
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the policyholder files the lawsuit. (Appellants' Brief, p. 25, saying the trial court misapplied 
the precedent). Car Dealers do not explain their reasoning. 
Car Dealers also argue that the insurance company in Surety Underwriters admitted it 
did not have a Utah insurer's license, so the opinion does not apply to this case because the 
license is disputed here. (Appellants' Brief, p. 26, fn 1). Policyholders' allegations (Facts, No. 
13, 42, 43, 44, 60, 61, 62) are assumed to be true for purposes of reviewing the denial of a 
motion to dismiss. Hansen v. Dept. of Fin. Inst,. 858 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App. 1993). 
Therefore, Facts 38, 42, 43, 61 and 62, asserting the opinion of the Director of the Life & 
Property Division that the insurers of Defendants' policies are not licensed in Utah, are 
presumed true. (See Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court.) 
Defendants overlook a singular point about Surety Underwriters : the court applied 
§31A-15-105(1) as substantive law in a contract dispute without requiring enforcement 
through the insurance department. 
Reason 5: Courts must enforce the Insurance Code in contract disputes; the 
Insurance Code preserves their jurisdiction to do that. 
[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the 
power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the 
insurance commissioner,"and "Appellees have failed to cite any express statutory authority 
permitting them to bring such claims." (Brief, pp. 23 and 33.)]. 
a. The Insurance Commissioner is N O T the sole enforcer of Utah 
insurance laws. He does not have judicial power to decide contract 
disputes. 
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As the head of an administrative agency, the Utah Insurance Commissioner has only 
the power specifically delegated to him by the Legislature. Robinson et al v. State, 20 P.3d 
396, 400 (Utah 2001). Because of Utah's separation of powers (Utah Constitution, Article V. 
Section 1), the commissioner's power to decide cases and controversies, a judicial power, is 
restricted. See judd, v. Drezga, 103 P3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004). We have no need to discern 
the boundaries of the commissioner's power to intervene in contract disputes between a 
policyholder and an insured because the Insurance Code does not give him that power. 
b. The Insurance Code requires courts to apply its rules in insurance 
contract lawsuits as if they were written into the contract. 
That Insurance Code is written to "maintain freedom of contract." Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-1-102(7). If a dispute arises between parties to an insurance contract, courts must apply 
the laws and policy of the Insurance Code in construing the contract. Allen v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 806 (Utah 1992). 
This broad duty of the courts to apply the Insurance Code is illustrated by Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-21-107, a section which parallels somewhat the remedy sought by the 
Policyholders under §31A-15-105. Part of chapter 21 , "Insurance Contracts in General," 
§31AA21-107, is entitled "Contract rights under noncomplying policies." The three part 
section makes insurance policies which do not meet the requirements of the Insurance Code 
"enforceable against the insurer." §31a-21-107(l). The statute gives the policyholder the right 
to compel the insurer to "reform, reissue or amend" the policy to conform to insurance laws. 
§31A-21 -107(2) and (3), and it dictates the burden of proof in court actions to reform the 
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contract to comply with the law. §31A-21-107(1) and (3). Utah courts are designated and 
trusted to apply insurance laws to insurance contract disputes. 
Fur thermore, the Utah Supreme Court has advocated more development of contract 
and equitable remedies in insurance contract disputes. In Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), the court surveyed several Utah cases applying 
substantive provisions of the insurance code in insurance contract disputes. IcL at 804-805. 
The court wrote: 
Notwithstanding our deference to legislative policy in this area, we necessarily 
retain authority to invalidate insurance provisions that are found contrary to 
public policy as expressed in the common law of contracts that has not been 
preempted by legislative enactment. . . .It is not clear why (contract rules). . .are 
insufficient to protect against overreaching insurers when applied on a 
case-by-case basis. . . in this state, we have yet to address and develop fully any 
of the existing equitable doctrines available to an aggrieved insured. IcL 
c. Courts apply the insurance code to contract d isputes even w h e n no 
private right of action is found under the code . 
As discussed at argument VII , 2.D.2 above, the Car Dealers (Appellants' Brief, pp. 32-
33) rely on three Utah insurance cases Machan v. U N U M Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342, 
348 (Utah 2005), Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006) and Cannon v. 
Travelers Indemn. Co., 994 P.2d 824,828-29 (Utah Ct. App . 2000), which refused to imply 
tort-like private rights of action into the claims practices sections of the insurance code 
because the code said in those sections the code specifically denied private rights of action. 
However , the Machan, Saleh and Cannon courts did not dismiss the contract claims. 
As the Supreme Court in Machan explained, the purposes of the Insurance Code "can be 
accomplished as well through a contract cause of action, without the analytical straining 
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necessitated by the tort approach." Machan, 116 P.3d 342, 348, quoting Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). "Even in the absence of a private right 
of action under section 31A-26-301, we would deem it proper for a court to take into account 
the legislature's mandates, as well as the insurance commissioner's regulations." Machan at 
349. 
Reason 6: T h e administrative remedies s u g g e s t e d by the Car Dealers are not 
required. 
[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the 
policy holders have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in §31A-2-201(4) . (Brief, 
pp. , 30-31)]. 
a. "Do you have a l icense?' is a yes or no quest ion. N o 
administrative proceed ing is required. 
The Car Dealers say Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201(6) requires an administrative 
remedy because it "places the question of whether or not Appellants were 'unauthorized 
insurers ' within the sole discretion of the Insurance Depar tment ," which alone "possesses the 
specialized skills and knowledge" to answer the issue. Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201(6) is a 
general instruction to the commissioner to conduct "investigations of insurance matters ." 
Noth ing says this is an exclusive remedy for a policyholder trying to avoid an insurance 
contract with an unauthorized insurer. 
"Unauthorized insurer" means unlicensed insurer. Utah Code Ann. §31 A- l -301 
(163)(a). " D o you have a license?' is a yes or no question. N o investigation is needed. 
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Appellant Car Dealers do not even claim to be licensed insurers; they are licensed as 
"limited lines producers" (sales agents) for credit insurance. (Statement of Fact N o . 12). 
Insurers cannot engage in any business other than insurance. Utah Code Ann. §31A-4-107(2). 
As to the other insurers of the Car Dealers policies, the Insurance Code simplifies the 
Commissioner 's role: 
When required for evidence in any legal proceeding, the commissioner shall 
furnish a certificate of the authority of any licensee to transact insurance 
business in Utah on any particular date. The court or other officer shall receive 
the certificate of authority in lieu of the commissioner's testimony. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-212(2). 
For the convenience of insurance agents and others who want to know whether an 
insurer is licensed, the Insurance Commission provides a searchable list on its website at 
h t tp : / /www.insurance.utah.gov/ index.html 
The same information is available by phone: (801) 538-3800. Policyholders provided 
a list of insurers to the trial court, and also a letter from the office of the Insurance 
Commissioner in support of their allegations. (Statement of Facts N o . 38, 60, 61 and 62). 
b. N o t h i n g in the statute requires the Policyholders to seek a 
declaratory order from the Commiss ioner before avoiding their 
contracts. 
Car Dealers argue that Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201(4)(b) is "an administrative means 
to address [Policyholders'] claims" and must be exhausted. (Appellants' Brief, pp . 30-31). 
The statute is found in a chapter describing the general powers and duties of the 
commissioner. It reads: 
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O n request of any person who would be affected by an order under Subsection 
(4)(a), the commissioner may issue a declaratory order to clarify the person's 
rights or duties. 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-2-201(4)(b). 
Policyholders are not subject to regulation by the Insurance Depar tment and have no 
duties which need to be clarified. Noth ing in this section or in §31A-15-105 requires a 
Policyholder to request a declaratory order clarifying her rights from the Commissioner 
before avoiding the contract. The plain language states: "The policyholder may avoid the 
contract by notice to the insurer..." §31A-15-105(2). Courts will not imply an administrative 
remedy into a plain and unambiguous statute. Hat ton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 828 P.2d 
1071, 1074 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
c. N o t h i n g in the statute authorizes the Commiss ioner to file this 
lawsuit on behalf of the pol icyholders . 
Car Dealers argue the Policyholders' contract avoidance right is "a limited right meant 
to be enforced through the Insurance Depar tment" which would "pursue the reimbursement 
claim against the violators of the Code in court." (Appellants' Brief, p . 30). In support of 
their argument, they quote "the original language of the chapter," the former Utah Code Ann. 
§31-38-2(1974)(Repealed 1985). 
The repealed statute is not present authority. Noth ing in Utah law gives the Insurance 
Depar tment standing to pursue contract avoidance claims on behalf of policyholders. 
Reason 7: §31A-15-105 is substantive law and is b ind ing on the parties and 
courts as if its terms were written into the contract. 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A- l 5-105 makes contracts voidable by the policyholder. Because 
it defines rights between the parties, the statute is substantive law. Washington National Ins. 
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Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah App. 1990). Substantive statutory remedies 
existing at the time of the contract "became part of the contract." Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d 
400, 407 (Utah 1935). "The laws of Utah, as then existing. . .formed a part of the contract as 
if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike 
those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement." IcL at 407, quoting 
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535,550 (1866). 
The trial court has jurisdiction over pending contract causes of action for rescission. 
(See description of those claims at Section A.l above). Even if no "private right of action" is 
found, as Car Dealers have argued., §31A-15-105 would still bind the parties in the contract 
claims. For all of the reasons above, the policyholders are justified in bringing an action 
under §31A-15-105(2). 
B. IN THEIR CHALLENGES TO CLASS CERTIFICATION, CAR DEALERS 
FAILED TO "MARSHAL ALL THE RECORD EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS 
THE CHALLENGED FINDING" UNDER APPELLATE RULE 24(A)(9). 
Car Dealers have asserted and argued their own statement of facts to show the trial 
court abused its discretion in its findings in support of class certification under Rule 23 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Car Dealers' arguments at pages 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 
48,49 of their brief.) 
The facts used in a class certification analysis under Rule 23 are those alleged by the 
representative plaintiffs which must be taken as true by the trial court. Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Tacquclin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). Unless the Car Dealers identify and address the facts 
relied on by the trial court, they cannot support their claim. It is not enough when an 
Appellant "identifies a number of factors he feels the trial court failed to consider in making 
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its factual findings" if he "fails to marshal the evidence supporting the findings he attacks." 
State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731/750 (Utah 2003). 
The trial court identified the source of the facts it relied on for its opinion, and the 
Policyholders have listed eighty-nine of those facts. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^fl8, 
ROA 2158)(Statement of Material facts Relied on by the Trial Court). Because Car Dealers 
have failed to meet their burden under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to "first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding," the trial 
court's class certification should be affirmed. 
C. T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CERTIFYING CLASSES TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTES CONCERNING 
THE DEALERSHIPS9 VEHICLE THEFT INSURANCE POLICIES, GAP 
INSURANCE POLICIES AND DEALERS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 
FEES (DOC FEES). 
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Commonality and 
Typicality under Rule 23(a) for the Vehicle Theft Insurance classes. 
The Rule. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The Policyholders' allegations concerning Vehicle Theft Protection 
insurance (VTP). 
Both dealerships sell Vehicle Theft policies that promise to pay benefits if the car 
stolen. 
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E d g e -Guard pol ic ies . Midway Auto Pla2a and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi both sell an 
insurance policy they call "Edge-guard" which insures the car owner against the risk of theft 
of the car. 
Using acid, the car dealers etch small numbers on the windows of every car in their 
inventory before the purchaser comes onto the lot. If the car buyer pays a premium of 
$299.95 for the guarantee policy, the etched number is registered with a database at an 
undisclosed location, and the car buyer is given a "warranty policy."(Statement of Facts N o . 
17 and 18). A copy of the Edge-guard policy is attached as Addendum F, R O A 1684. (No 
other version of the policy appears to have been used.) 
The policy promises a "$2,500 & $5,000 Benefit Recovery Guarantee" if the car is 
stolen. The parties to the contract are the policyholder and the car dealer, who signs as 
"Dealer-Rep" and "Seller." Benefits are paid by "The E D G E program administrator," which 
apparently receives reimbursement for its losses from an unidentified insurance company. 
(Statement of Facts N o . 19, 20, 28). The policyholder is not in privity with any insurance 
company, and the policy states "this is not a policy of insurance." (Addendum F). 
Although the policy seems to promise an "Anti-Theft $2500 & $5000 Benefit 
Recovery Guarantee," (Addendum F, see large, bold print above first paragraph), the body of 
the paragraph seems to promise only "a discount allowance toward the purchase of a new 
vehicle" or "reimbursement up to $1000.00 of the primary insurance deductible" depending 
upon whether the stolen car is recovered or not recovered. 
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Named Plaintiff Severo Rodriguez bought an Edge-Guard policy from Midway Auto 
Plaza on June 1, 2004, and named Plaintiff Nicholas Rodarte bought an Edge-Guard policy 
from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi on May 22, 2004. (Statement of Facts No. 21 and 22). 
Midway Auto sold more than 1500 Vehicle Theft policies from 2000 through 2006; 
Mike Riddle Mitsubishi sold more than 1,150 Vehicle Theft policies from 2004 through 2006. 
(Statement of Facts No. 39 and 40). More recent sales number are not available. 
Specific complaints about Edge-guard policies. The Edge-Guard theft policy is 
an illusory contract which is so vague that its promises are incomprehensible. (Addendum F, 
first full paragraph, ROA 1684). Questions about what the benefit is and what the 
policyholder must do to get the $2,500 or $5,000 benefit are unanswerable. 
VTP policies. Midway Auto Plaza sold a product called "VTP" in the years 2001 
through 2003. This "warranty policy" promised "up to $1,500" if the car was stolen and not 
recovered. Only the policyholder and the car dealer signed the policies. The promise to pay 
benefits is from a company called "VTP" and "VTP Vehicle Theft Protection," which is an 
unregistered d.b.a. of "Competitive Dealer Services," an unregistered d.b.a. of Michelle 
Davis of Bountiful, Utah. (Statement of Facts No. 29). (Addendum 1686, see promise in ^ 
9, "VTP will pay the registered owner...", ROA 1686 and reverse side). 
Plaintiff Dalton Jaques purchased a VTP policy for $3,500 from Midway Auto Plaza 
on August 9, 2004. (Statement of Facts No. 32). The usual premium for VTP was $299.95. 
(ROA 194). 
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Policyholders' complaints about Edge-guard and VTP policies. In the trial 
court, the Car Dealers denied their vehicle theft policies were insurance contracts. They 
appear to admit this allegation for the first time on appeal. (Appellants' Brief, Facts 62-65). 
It is puzzling how Car Dealers, who denied they were insurance when they sold them, 
now say the policies were in full compliance with insurance laws. 
None of the entities listed in the Edge-Guard and VTP policies are licensed insurers 
(Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, No. 38, 41, 42, 43, and 44), in 
violation of §31 A-15-101 throughl03. The policies were not approved by the commissioner 
and did not meet the statutory requirements for insurance policies (e.g., see §31A-21-301, 
"policies must state the exact name and address of the insurer"). The Car Dealer insurance 
agents are licensed to sell "limited lines credit insurance" (see definition at §31A-1-301(98)), 
but not property insurance like the vehicle theft policies. (Statement of Facts No. 12 and 13). 
Their licenses do not authorize them to sell insurance from unlicensed insurers. (§31 A-15-
103) (Statement of Facts No. 12, 13, 38, 42, 43, 44). 
The Vehicle Theft insurance class causes of action. Plaintiffs assert three class 
causes of action on the Edge-Guard and VTP policies under the Second Amended Class 
Action Complaint : 
COUNT 6. Contract avoidance under §31A-15-105. Avoidance of the policies, 
discussed above, for class members who elect, after fair notice, to cancel the policy and claim 
a refund of the price they paid. 
COUNT 8. Injunctive relief and contract rescission for violation of public policy. 
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This count alleges that the Vehicle Theft policies violated public policy as set forth in 
the statutes of the states. Specifically: the benefits were not promised by licensed insurers 
(§31A-15-101-103), the policies were not approved by the commissioner and did not meet 
the statutory requirements for insurance policies (see §31A-21-301, "the exact name of the 
insurer"), and the selling agents were nor properly licensed to sell insurance from unlicensed 
insurers. (Statement of Facts N o . 12, 13, 38, 42, 43, and 44). Plaintiffs seek rescission of the 
contracts and restitution of the $299.95 premium for all members of the class who so elect 
after fair notice (or whatever they paid). 
C O U N T 9. Rescission of an illusory contract. Under this count, Plaintiffs seek a 
declaration that Edge-Guard theft policy is a vague, incomprehensible and illusory contract 
which (see Addendum F, R O A 1684, first full paragraph) which binds no-one. Plaintiffs seek 
rescission of the contracts and restitution of the $299 premium for all members of the class 
who so elect after fair notice. 
3. For class action certification, Plaintiffs' al legations are taken as true. 
The Car Dealers have included a Statement of Facts which they say contradicts the 
Trial Court 's ruling. See, for example, their claim that "Appellants ' policies are undisputedly 
underwritten by qualified insurers." (Appellants Brief, p.62). This contradicts the 
Policyholders' principal allegation that none of the benefits promised were to be paid by a 
licensed insurer in Utah. (Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, N o . 12, 
13, 38, 42, 43, and 44, supported by a letter from the Utah Depar tment of Insurance). The 
Car Dealers appear to misunderstand the trial court has not made factual rulings, but has 
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assumed the Policyholders facts to be true for purposes of Rule 23. (Addendum A, Trial 
Court Order , | 1 8 , R O A 2158). 
In determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the 
complaint are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) 
(Class certification requires an inquiry into whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met 
rather than whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits.) 
T h e Trial Court's ruling: 
The plaintiffs have argued that there is one question that applies to all 
members of the proposed classes: whether the defendants ' vehicle theft 
policies violate the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are 
available. The defendants have argued that the plaintiffs' complaint fails to 
identify a common plan or scheme of wrongdoing, and the factual and legal 
questions of the plaintiffs vary according to each individual transaction with 
the defendants. Because the circumstances of each transaction may vary, the 
defendants argued, there is no commonality and the proposed classes may not 
be certified. 
The defendants noted that while all of the proposed class members 
purchased vehicle theft policies, the class members did not purchase the same 
types of vehicle theft policies, and those products did not involve the same 
administrator with the same underwriter. Thus , argue the defendants, a trial for 
this case would "devolve into a series of individual trials on issues peculiar to 
each plaintiff." Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 166 (D. Kan. 1996). 
The Court finds that the issues are not so complicated as argued by the 
defendants. In this case, the primary consideration is whether the defendants 
sold the plaintiffs an insurance product at a time when the defendants did not 
have a license to sell insurance products . It is irrelevant whether these products 
had different administrators a n d / o r different underwriters, because the basis of 
the claim is not that the plaintiffs were given products that were improperly 
administered or were not properly supported by underwriters, but instead that 
the insurance products were improperly sold and invalid from the beginning. 
.... The plaintiffs' motions for class certification are all G R A N T E D . 
The Court does note, however, that the certification of the proposed classes 
for claims based on the sale of vehicle theft policies is conditional on the 
inclusion of three classes, instead of two. 
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Addendum A, Order on Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle 
Theft Policies, fflf 34, 35, 36 and 75, R O A 2164, 2177. 
4. T h e trial court considered and properly rejected the Car Dealers ' 
object ions . 
In this appeal, the Car Dealers have renewed the same objections addressed by the 
trial court. 
a. " C o m m o n Plan or Scheme" is not the test . Car Dealers again argue that 
certification was an abuse of discretion because the Policyholders' "Complaint fails to 
adequately plead a c o m m o n plan or c o m m o n scheme of wrongdoing with regard to the sale 
of V T P products ," and that the Car Dealers "did not engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 53). They apparently believe the Policyholders must prove the Car 
Dealers acted "underhanded or shady or even unique from other car dealers." (Appellants' 
Brief, p.62). 
Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class," and that " the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class." N o nefarious plan or scheme needs to be proven, and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to accept this argument. 
b . Questions of law or fact are common to the class. Appellants say " N o Issues 
of fact are c o m m o n to all class members ." (Appellants' Brief, p.55). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. C o m m o n questions of fact include: 1) 
whether class members purchased Vehicle Theft policies from these dealers and 2) whether 
the insurers of those policies are licensed to be insurers in the state of Utah. Another 
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common question of fact is whether the policy forms were approved by the Utah 
Depar tment of Insurance. C o m m o n questions of law include: 1) whether the insurers and 
policies comply with Utah insurance law, and 2) whether the policyholders have a legal 
remedy for return of their premiums. N o individual question of law or fact is important. 
c. The case will not require more than 1,700 different trials. (Appellants' Brief, 
pp . 55-56). The Policyholders allege that every vehicle theft policy sold by these car dealers 
violated Utah insurance law because the insureds were not licensed by the state of Utah. The 
trial court separated the inquiry into two classes, one for each policy. Within the classes, 
Policyholders allege that every policy used the same form, was sold by the same agent, and 
has the same unlicensed insurer. All are invalid for the same reasons. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding "the issues are not so 
complicated as argued by the defendants." (Addendum A, f 36, R O A 2164). The insurance 
issues will likely be decided on summary judgment after additional fact discovery. 
5. T h e trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Commonal i ty and 
Typicality under Rule 23(a) for the GAP Insurance c lasses . 
T h e Rule. " O n e or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
T h e Pol icyholders' al legations concerning GAP Insurance. Both dealerships sell 
G A P insurance policies that promise to pay benefits if the car is wrecked. 
51 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Car Dealers may sell GAP credit insurance only from licensed insurers. GAP 
insurance is a type of credit insurance. (Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-301(69), and both Car 
Dealers have been licensed by the State of Utah as "limited lines insurance producers" to sell 
credit insurance, but only from a licensed insurer. Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-102(1). 
GAP insurance policies. When a car is totaled, Guaranteed Automobile Protection 
(GAP) insurance will pay the remaining balance of the car loan (the "gap") after the owner's 
comprehensive insurance coverage has paid. (Statement of Facts No. 45). 
As sold by most commercial lenders, GAP insurance is a three party agreement in 
which the debtor purchases insurance underwritten by a commercial insurance company to 
pay the loan if the car is destroyed. (Statement of Facts No. 47). 
Both Car Dealers sell a modified version of GAP often referred to as a "waiver 
GAP." (Statement of Facts No. 49). GAP waivers are two-party insurance contracts 
between the dealer and the car buyer in which the separate insurance premium, usually 
between $500 and $600, buys forgiveness (waiver) of the balance owed under the installment 
sales contract if the car is destroyed. (Statement of Facts No. 50 and 52). The Car Dealers' 
insurance policy is an addendum to the installment sales contract. (Statement of Facts No. 53; 
See Addendum I and J for sample GAP policies OwnerGuard and AHIS, ROA 1764, 1765). 
The Car Dealers admit these are insurance policies. (Appellants Brief, Facts 67, 69). 
In all of their GAP waiver policies except Beacon GAP, the Car Dealers assume the 
risk of the loss of the car as the principal in the insurance contract. In the Beacon GAP 
policies, a foreign business called Beacon Industries Worldwide, Inc. ("Beacon") assumes the 
risk of the loss of the car in the contract. (Statement of Facts No. 54; See Addendum H for a 
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sample Beacon GAP policy, ROA 1760-1762). In the view of the Utah Department of 
Insurance, these Car Dealers are acting as the insurers in their policies, are not licenced as 
insurers. 
The Car Dealers' GAP policies are written and sold to the Car Dealers by agents for 
foreign companies who act as GAP "administrators" to receive claims and decide whether 
the dealer should accept or deny them. (Statement of Facts No. 56). If the "administrator" 
accepts the claim, the Dealer or its successor waives the balance owed on the installment sales 
contract after payment from the car owner's collision insurance. (Statement of Facts No. 57). 
Midway Auto Plaza sold more than 1,500 GAP policies after opening in 2000; 328 of 
these policies were from Beacon. Mike Riddle Mitsubishi sold more than 1,140 GAP policies 
after opening in 2004; 346 of these policies were from Beacon. (Statement of Facts No. 58 
and 59). 
The Common complaint about these Car Dealers' GAP policies. As the 
contracting party assuming the risk, the Car Dealers become the insurers in their GAP 
contracts. (See Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, 60-63; August 17, 
2007 letter from Utah Department of Insurance, Addendum D second letter, ROA 1741-
1742).1 The Car Dealers and Beacon are not licensed as insurers in Utah. (Statement of Facts 
1
 Utah law defines an insurer as, "any person doing an insurance business as a principal." 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1 -301 (87)(a)(i). "An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and 
the insured..." Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 44 P.3d 663, 676 (Utah 2002). 
"An insurer is the party to a contract of insurance who assumes the risk and undertakes to 
indemnify the insured, or pay a certain sum on the happening of a specified contingency." Couch 
on Insurance, § 39:1 (2004). 
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60-63). See Utah Code Ann. §31A-4-107(2). Insurers cannot operate any business other than 
an insurance company. 
T h e class action causes of action for GAP insurance. The Policyholders Second 
Amended Class Action Complaint seeks the relief described in Counts 10, 12 and 13. 
1). C O U N T 10. Contract avoidance under §31A-15-105. Because the Car Dealers 
and Beacon were not licensed as insurers, all sales of the Car Dealers ' G A P policies violate 
the Utah Insurance Code, as discussed above. Policyholders seek a declaration that the 
practice is illegal, injunctive relief and avoidance of the contract for all members of the class 
who elect, after fair notice, to avoid the policy and claim a refund. 
2). C O U N T 12. Injunctive relief and contract rescission for violation of public 
policy. Policyholders seek a declaration that the practice is illegal, injunctive relief and 
rescission of all Defendants ' G A P insurance contracts for class members who elect, after 
notice, to cancel the policy and claim a refund. 
3). C O U N T 13. Rescission of an illusory contract. Policyholders seek a 
declaration that the Beacon G A P policies are illusory. In the policies, Beacon Industries 
Worldwide, Inc. agrees to waive all sums owed under the installment sales agreement between 
the car buyer and the car dealer. Beacon holds no interest in the installment sales contract, so 
its promise to waive the debt is meaningless and is illusory. 
Policyholders also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the sale of these policies, and the 
remedy of rescission of the Beacon G A P insurance contracts for class members who elect, 
after fair notice, to cancel the policy and claim a refund. 
Summary: N o n e of these Car Dealers ' insurance pol ic ies are legal in Utah . 
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These Car Dealers search for legitimacy in their claim "products like these ... are 
common in the industry. . ." (Appellants' Brief, alleged fact 12, See also, fact 67). What they 
mean is that mos t car dealers sell vehicle theft insurance and G A P insurance. What they do not 
mean is that most car dealers sell these policies. None of the policies sold by these car dealers are legal 
in Utah. 
For class action certification, Plaintiffs' al legations are taken as true. In 
determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the complaint 
are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, supra. 
T h e Trial Court's ruling. 
The plaintiffs have argued that the claims of the members of the 
proposed classes related to the G A P insurance policies are common, because 
there is one question to be answered: do the defendants ' G A P policies violate 
the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are available to the 
members of the class? The plaintiffs did note that there were several insurers 
involved, including Midway, Beacon, and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi, and the 
products were sold by both Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi. 
The defendants raised an argument similar to the argument they raised 
in the memorandum in opposition for the mot ion to certify classes re: vehicle 
theft policies. The defendants argued that the proposed class members 
purchase different types of G A P insurance, with different administrators, with 
different underwriters, and different policy forms. Because of these differences, 
the defendants argued that the commonality requirement has not been met. 
... Taking the plaintiffs' argument as true and correct, there would be 
only two classes, and each individual would have a common claim: that he or 
she purchased an invalid insurance policy from one of the defendant 
dealerships. It does not appear that it matters who the administrator or 
underwriter was, because the basis of the claim is not that there was no proper 
insurer involved at any point, but rather that the individual purchasers did not 
have privity of contract with a proper insurer. Instead, the individual 
purchasers only had privity of contract with one of the defendants, and the 
contract between the parties was invalid because the defendant dealerships 
were no t licensed to sell insurance products. 
The Court therefore finds that the proposed classes related to G A P insurance policies 
have satisfied the commonality requirement. 
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Addendum A, Order on Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle 
Theft Policies, ffl[ 39 through 43, R O A 2165-2167. 
T h e trial court cons idered and properly rejected the Car Dealers ' object ions . 
Policyholders allege that none of these Car Dealers ' insurance policies are legal in Utah, so 
variations in the manner of sale do not matter. 
Car Dealers have renewed the same objections addressed by the trial court. 
a. " C o m m o n Plan or Scheme" is not the test. Car Dealers again argue they "did 
not engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme (Appellants' Brief, p. 61-62). They apparently 
believe the Policyholders must prove the Car Dealers acted "underhanded or shady or even 
unique from other car dealers." (Appellants' Brief, p.62). 
Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class," and that "the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class." N o nefarious plan or scheme needs to be proven, and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to accept this argument. . -
b. Questions of law or fact are c o m m o n to the class. Appellants say " N o Issues 
of fact are c o m m o n to all class members . " (Appellants' Brief, p.63). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. C o m m o n questions of fact include: 1) 
whether class members purchased G A P insurance policies from these dealers and 2) whether 
the car dealers, or Beacon Industries are licensed to act as insurers of those policies. The Car 
Dealers do not claim to be licensed insurers - insurers in Utah cannot also run another 
business such as a car dealership. Utah Code Ann. §31A-4-107(2). Neither do they claim 
Beacon was a licensed insurer. 
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Because Policyholders allege all of Car Dealers' insurance policies violate the same 
Utah laws for the same reason, the legal issues are the same across the class. 
c. Will not require more than 2,600 different trials. (Appellants' Brief, p.64). The 
Policyholders allege that every GAP policy sold by these dealers violated Utah insurance law 
because the insureds were not licensed in Utah. Although the policy forms differed, all are 
invalid for the same reasons. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by finding: 
each individual would have a common claim: that he or she purchased an 
invalid insurance policy from one of the defendant dealerships. It does not 
appear that it matters who the administrator or underwriter was, because the 
basis of the claim is not that there was no proper insurer involved at any point, 
but rather that the individual purchasers did not have privity of contract with a 
proper insurer. 
Addendum A, Trial court order, f 42, ROA 2166-2167. 
This is reasonable in light of the claims asserted. The Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in certifying the GAP claims. 
6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Commonality and 
Typicality under Rule 23(a) for the Dealer Documentary Service Fees 
(Doc Fees) classes. 
The Rule. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Policyholders' allegations concerning Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc 
Fees). Both dealerships charge the same Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc Fee). 
a. Summary: Defendants have violated every Utah law governing 
Documentary Fees. 
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The charging of Doc Fees by car dealers is regulated in Utah by statute and 
administrative rules from the Motor Vehicle Enforcement division of the Utah Tax 
Commission. These Car Dealers and most other car dealers in the state charge Doc Fees for 
preparing and processing documents and registering and titling the vehicle in the name of the 
buyer. Car Buyers complain that the Car Dealers have violated every applicable state statute 
and regulation. 
b. Defendants have violated the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation 
Act and regulations. (Count 2 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action 
Complaint.) 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, Utah Code §41-3-1 et seq., was 
enacted to protect purchasers and lessees of motor vehicles in Utah through uniform rules 
and regulations and licensing requirements for motor vehicle sellers. 
These regulations were adopted under authority of the Motor Vehicle Business 
Regulation Act and given the force of law in Utah Code §41-3-210(c)and(d). 
c. Advertising and Selling Violations 
In charging a Doc Fee, the Car Dealers have violated the Dealer License Holder 
Prohibitions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, Utah Code §41-3-1 et. seq., 
especially §41-3-201(1)(a) which prohibits misleading or inaccurate advertising by dealers. 
Plaintiffs are complaining about the written offers of sale, sometimes called "pencils, 
which were given to and accepted by all class members. (Statement of Facts No. 70, 71, 72, 
and 73). These written offers are "advertisements" under Utah law, and they did not include 
the doc fees. (Statement of Facts No. 76). "Advertisement" means: any written, oral, or 
graphic statement or representation made by a supplier in connection with the solicitation of 
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business... It does not include any oral, in person, representation made by a sales 
representative to a prospective purchaser." Utah Code Ann. §13-11 a-2. 
The Car Dealers violated this specific regulation under the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Business Regulation Act, which by its own terms applies to more than just public advertising: 
A violation of any of the following standards of practice for the advertising and 
selling of motor vehicles is a violation of Section 41-3-210: 
2. Bait. Bait advertising and selling practices may not be used. A vehicle 
advertised at a specific price. . .shall be willingly shown, demonstrated and 
sold. . .at the advertised price and terms. . . . 
3. Price. When the price of a vehicle is quoted. . .the stated price must 
include all charges that the customer must pay for the vehicle, including 
freight or destination charges, dealer preparation, dealer handling, additional 
dealer profit, document fees, and undercoating or rustproofing. 
Utah Administrative Code, Rule R877-23V-7 (emphasis added) . 
The Car Dealers violate this rule every time they quote the price of a vehicle in a 
written offer and give it to a consumer without including the $399.95 Doc Fee in the price. 
Each violation of Rule R877-23V-7 by Defendants is a criminal act by virtue of Utah Code 
§41-3-701, and subjects the Car Dealers to civil sanctions, including the right of a purchaser 
to maintain a civil action, under Utah Code Ann. §§41-3-404(l)(iii) and 41-3-702. 
d. Violation of Regulatory Rule Requiring Special Segregation of 
Dealer Documentary Fees in Motor Vehicle Contracts 
In charging a Doc Fee, the Car Dealers have violated Administrative Rule R877-23V-
14 of the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division of the Utah Tax Commission. That rule, 
which has the force of a statutory violation under Utah Code §41-3-1 et. seq., esp. §41-3-
201(l)(c), requires these car dealers to "segregate and separately identify the fees required by 
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Title 41, Chapter la, as state-mandated fees. . . .A dealer that fails to segregate and separately 
identify state-mandated fees. . .is in violation of Title 41, Chapter 3." The "state-mandated" 
fees are taxes and license fees the dealer must collect to issue a temporary permit for the car. 
The Car Dealers have violated this rule in every contract of sale. (Addendum K 
sample sales contract of Severo Rodriguez, ROA 1984). They do not "segregate and 
identify" state mandated fees. The placement of the Documentary Fees on line 27 is just two 
lines below the "State Waste Tire Recycling Fee," which is immediately below the "State 
Inspections/Emissions Test," making it difficult to tell which charges are state mandated and 
which are not, such as dealer doc fees. 
e. Violation of the Regulatory Rule Requiring Special Prominent Sign as a 
Condition for Charging a Dealer Documentary Service Fee 
Rule R877-23V-14 also requires car dealers who charge doc fees to "prominently 
display a sign on the dealer premises in such location as to readily discernable by all 
purchasers, consumers, or lessees." IcL (emphasis added). The language of the sign is 
given in the rule. The Car Dealers claim to have small signs which meet the rule in their 
finance offices, where consumers are not invited until after they agree to purchase a car, but 
the Car Buyers allege they are not "prominently" displayed "in such location as to be readily 
discernable by all purchasers, consumers, or lessees," because 1) their location means 
customers do not see them until after they have already struck the deal to buy the car, 2) 
other customers, "Consumers," never see them, and 3) the 5" x 6" or 6" x 6" signs are too 
small. 
60 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Until the Car Dealers prominently display their required signs in locations where all 
consumers can readily discern them and consider them while negotiating to buy a car, they 
are violating the law. 
Plaintiffs are seeking judgment for a refund of the Doc Fees paid by all members of 
the class, in addition to injunctive relief mandating compliance with the law. 
f. Defendants' common scheme of charging Documentary Fees is in 
breach of the U.C.C. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
After a consumer and the dealer negotiate the price of a car, the consumer accepts the 
dealers offer by signing the "pencil" on the back of the proposal worksheet. (Addendum L 
sample worksheet or pencil, ROA 1921). If a consumer and the dealer negotiate a sale of a 
car for $12,000 plus tax and licence, for example, the deal is struck. "The obligation of the 
seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with 
the contract." Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-301. The car buyer anticipates a more formal 
contract, consistent with the negotiated terms. When the dealer refuses to sell the car without 
additional profit through a $399.95 Doc Fee, the dealer is acting in bad faith. For the dealer, 
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
or enforcement." Utah Code Ann. §70A-l-203. 
The proper remedy for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
rescission of the contract. Plaintiffs are seeking that remedy and injunctive relief. 
g. Car Dealers have violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act. (Count 1 of 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint.) 
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The Utah Unfair Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1, et. seq., makes it unlawful for 
the Car Dealers to receive or accept compensation which exceeds the actual cost to them for 
services rendered in connection with the sale of goods. Utah Code Annotated, §13-5-3 (3). 
Defendants ' charges of $249.00 to $399.95 during the class period are excessive and 
are mostly additional profit to the dealership. (Statement of Facts N o . 63). 
Further, by charging D o c Fees to Policyholders and Class Members , the Car Dealers 
have engaged in unfair methods of competit ion which are unlawful under Utah Code Ann. 
§13-5-2.5 (1). Unfair methods of competition are described by the rules and regulations cited 
above, and by Utah Code Ann. §13-5-8 which reads, "I t shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in business within the state to advertise goods, wares, or merchandise that person is 
no t prepared to supply." The Car Dealers are not prepared to supply the car unless an 
additional doc fee is paid. Contracts in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act are illegal 
and void, and Car Buyers are entitled to injunctive relief and damages (return of the doc fee). 
Utah Code Ann., §§13-5-13 and 14. 
h. Defendants charges for Documentary F e e s should be resc inded as b e i n g 
il legal and in violation of publ ic pol icy (Count 4 of Plaintiffs Second 
Amended Class Action Complaint). 
This cause of action seeks the common law remedy of rescission for the conduct 
described above for the following additional reasons. 
Violation of the Utah Motor Vehic le Act. By requiring car buyers to pay doc fees 
for registering the car, the Dealers deprive car buyers of the benefit of their statutory right to 
register the car themselves under the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann §41-la-101, 
et. seq., especially §41-la-209. 
62 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T h e Car Dealers violate the Utah Truth in Advertis ing Act. The Car Dealers 
have violated Utah Code Ann §13-1 la-1 by changing the terms of the sale after making 
written offers and agreeing to sell the car at a price which did not include the doc fees. 
(Statement of Facts 71 , 72, 73, 74 and 75). 
i. Car Dealers are unjustly enriched by their col lect ion of Documentary 
Fees . (Count 5 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint). 
For the reasons described above, equity demands restitution of the wrongly collected 
Documentary Fees. 
For class action certification, Car Buyers' al legations are taken as true. In 
determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the complaint 
are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,- 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974)(Class 
certification requires an inquiry into whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met rather than 
whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits). 
T h e Trial Court's ruling certifying the D o c Fees claims: 
The plaintiffs' claims related to dealer documentary service fees are 
based on the allegations that each member of the proposed class paid a dealer 
documentary service fee, but that the fee was charged in addition to the 
advertised price, the fee was mostly profit to the dealer, the defendants failed 
to post signs informing customers about the fee, and the fees were not 
specifically segregated in the motor vehicle contracts (thus implying that it was 
a state-mandated fee). 
The defendants again argued that there is insufficient commonality 
between the claims of the members of the proposed class, because the amount 
of the documentary fees changed over time, and the actual profit collected by 
the dealers was different for each transaction, because each transaction 
involved different amounts of paperwork. The defendants noted that the issue 
of whether the sign was posted would require each member of the proposed 
class to answer questions about matters such as where the contracts were 
signed, and whether the individual saw any signs informing them of the dealer 
fees. The issue of whether the fees were part of the advertised price would 
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require individual questioning of who the salesperson or manager was, whether 
the customer signed the "worksheet," and whether the "pencil" made any 
ment ion of documentary fees. The issue of whether the salesperson a n d / o r 
contract implied that the documentary fee was state-mandated would require 
individual questioning about what the contract looked like, whether the 
customer read the contract, and what statements were made by the salesperson. 
The plaintiff noted in response that the evidence does and will show 
that transactions between prospective purchasers and the defendant 
dealerships followed the same process, the dealerships used almost identical 
forms, the sales process takes place in the same area of the dealerships, that the 
documentary fee was never discussed between the salesperson and the buyer, 
and that it is clear that in both dealerships the sign about the fee was posted in 
a location where it could not be seen by customers, but could only be seen 
after the customer had decided to purchase a car and entered the finance 
office. 
The plaintiffs have requested one remedy for the defendants ' alleged 
violations: a return of all dealer documentary service fees charged to members 
of the proposed classes. It appears that this remedy is based on one key 
question: did the defendants ' actions violate the law and thus render the 
documentary fee provisions of the sales contract invalid? That question is 
c o m m o n to all members of the proposed classes. The individualized inquiry 
described by the defendants is not necessary and the members of the proposed 
classes related to dealer documentary service fees have met the commonality 
requirement. 
Addendum A, Order on Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle 
Theft Policies, f f 44 through 47, R O A 2167-2168. 
T h e trial court cons idered and properly rejected the Car Dealers ' object ions . 
In this appeal, the Car Dealers have renewed their objections in the trial court. 
a. " C o m m o n Plan or S c h e m e " is not the test. Car Dealers again argue 
they"did not engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme (Appellants' Brief, p. 40-41). They 
apparently believe the Policyholders must prove the Car Dealers acted "underhanded or 
shady or even unique from other car dealers." (Appellants' Brief, p.62). 
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Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact common to the class," and that "the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class." The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept this argument. 
b. Material facts do not vary with each individual transaction. 
(Appellants'Brief, p.63). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this. 
The plaintiff noted in response that the evidence does 
and will show that transactions between prospective purchasers 
and the defendant dealerships followed the same process, the 
dealerships used almost identical forms, the sales process takes 
place in the same area of the dealerships, that the documentary 
fee was never discussed between the salesperson and the buyer, 
and that it is clear that in both dealerships the sign about the fee 
was posted in a location where it could not be seen by 
customers, but could only be seen after the customer had 
decided to purchase a car and entered the finance office. 
The plaintiffs have requested one remedy for the 
defendants ' alleged violations. 
Addendum A, Trial Court Order , | | 46 and 47, R O A 2168. 
This view of the trial court is reasonable. 
7. T h e trial court did not abuse its discretion in f inding the class 
representatives to be adequate under Rule 23(a) for the all three class 
actions. 
T h e Law. Utah Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(4) requires only that"the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 
T h e trial court cons idered and properly rejected the Car Dealers ' object ions. 
The Car Dealers raise again the same arguments trial court carefully considered and rejected. 
a. T h e trial court cons idered the full context of the test imony; Car 
Dealers omit the context here. 
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Car Dealers argue without support from the record, "several of the named Appellees, 
such as Jodi Poll Hollbrook and Gregory Heiner, affirmatively state they have no objection to 
Appellees' practice of charging D o c Fees." (Appellants Brief, p. 47.) The trial court 
considered the full context of the testimony of the class representatives. Jodi Ho lbook said 
only that she did not object to the doc fees at the time of the sale, and Gregory Heiner does not 
object to "a dealer" charging a "reasonable and customary" documentary fee. (ROA 1326-
1328, 1330-1332, Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of 
Class Re: Dealer Documentary Service Fee Exhibits K and L). 
Car Dealers now argue without support from the record that Dal ton Jaques, Elisha 
Dela Garza and Nicholas Rodarte are "only interested in their own claims." (Appellants 
Brief, pp . 47, 48, 58, 66, 67.) These characterizations are out of context. Mr. Jaques 
testimony, for example, said the opposite, yet Car Dealers unreasonably isolate the last " n o " 
in his testimony: 
Q Would it be fair to say that that's really all you're concerned about, 
are your claims? 
A N o . 
Q You're concerned about others? 
A Yeah. 
Q But you'll let the others prosecute their own claims? 
A I don' t understand what you mean. Can I 
prosecute other peoples' claims? 
Q Is that what you're intending to do? 
A N o . 
Deposi t ion of Dal ton Jaques, R O A 1455, — Exhibit P to same reply memo above.). 
The trial court had a better opportunity to consider the full context of these and other 
objections by the Car Dealers, and has wide discretion in certification issues. 
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b. The trial court correctly applied the law. 
The court noted: 
...it appears that the test for determining whether an individual can be a proper 
class representative is not a stringent one. It does not appear that a proposed 
class representative is required to understand the case and the legal theories of 
the case. Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Utah 1998) 
(internal citations omitted). Instead, the primary test is whether counsel for the 
proposed class representative is qualified to litigate the case, and whether the 
class representative has interests antagonistic to the class. Id. (Internal citation 
omitted). 
Addendum A, Trial Court Order, f 53, ROA 2171. 
Both parties agree that Ditty v. Check Rite, states the rule, (see Appellants' Brief, 
pp.36, 38, 46, and 57.). In that case, the Federal District Court in Utah said: 
Although some courts have inquired into the named plaintiffs' understanding 
of the lawsuit or their character, that factor is generally given little weight. See, 
e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366, 15 L. Ed. 2d 807, 86 
S. Ct. 845 (1966) (finding plaintiff an adequate class representative even though 
"she did not understand the complaint at all, . . . could not explain the 
statements made in the complaint, . . . had a very small degree of knowledge as 
to what the lawsuit was about, . . . did not know any of the defendants by 
name; . . .did not know the nature of their alleged misconduct, and in fact . . . 
had merely relied on what her son-in-law had explained to her about the facts 
in the case.") Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689, 117 S. Ct. 
2231, 2251 & n.20 (1997) (looking solely to competence of counsel and 
structural conflicts between named plaintiffs and other class members under 
Rule 23(a)(4)). 
Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd. 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Utah 1998). 
A Plaintiff may be an adequate class representative even when he displays "a complete 
ignorance of the facts concerning the transaction he was challenging." Shamberg v. 
Ahlstrom, 111 F.R.D. 689, 695 (D.NJ. 1986). 
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"The only relevant inquiry is whether the named plaintiffs are concerned is whether 
they possess some interest that is antagonistic to other members of the class." Ditty v. Check 
Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D, at 642 . "If there are any doubts about adequate representation, they 
should be resolved in favor of upholding the class, subject to later possible 
reconsiderat ion."Newberg on Class Actions, §7.24. 
8. T h e trial court did not abuse its discretion in f inding predominance and 
superiority and adequate under Rule 23(b) for the all three class act ions. 
T h e Rule. To certify a class, the court must find, 
that the questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members , and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. 
Rule 23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
T h e Trial Court's ruling. O n the issue of predominance, the court found: 
The Court does find that because the claims presented in all of the proposed 
classes are based on alleged common courses of conduct, which allegedly apply 
to all of the members of the class, the issues presented in this action do 
predominate over individual claims. In fact, it appears that this class action 
encompasses almost all of the potential individual claims, with the exception of 
those that have been severed from this case. Thus , the proposed classes all 
meet the predominance requirement. 
Addendum A, Trial Court Ruling, f 66, R O A 2174-2175). 
This is no t unreasonable. 
9. Car Dealers misunderstand the test for superiority. 
Car Dealers object to the finding that a class action is superior method for 
adjudicating the controversy because, they argue, the class representatives care more about 
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their own claims so their interest in prosecuting separate actions is antagonistic to the class. 
(Appellants Brief, pp. 50, 60, 69). 
In this case, the Car Dealers misapply the rule which considers "the interest of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions." Rule 23(b)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The phrase, "interest of 
members of the class" does not refer to class representatives, but to the interest of absent 
class members in pursuing their own claims as evidenced by a number of separate actions 
filed on the same issue. As the U.S. Supreme Court described this, "The interests of 
individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for denial of a class 
action. On the other hand. . .the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that 
separate suits would be impracticable." Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
616 (1997). The trial court view this issue correctly. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^[68, 
ROA2173) 
This case certifies claims which are so small, no individual could afford to pursue it, 
and the Car Dealers' conduct would not change. As the Amchem Court observed, 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the 
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual 
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this 
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something 
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor. 
Amchem Products, Inc. V. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 
109 F.3d 338, 344(1997). 
The trial court also followed the Utah Supreme Court's approval of class actions to 
allow "access to the courts for numerous claimants to request redress of claims that are too 
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small to merit the expenses of litigation on an individual basis." Call v. City of West Jordan, 
727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, a class action is the only method for change and redress of the wrongs by 
these Car Dealers. This case was properly certified. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the 
trial court to deny the Car Dealers' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging 
Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Polices. The plain language of the statute provides for a 
claim by the policyholder. 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the trial court to Grant the 
Policyholders' Motions for Certification of Class regarding vehicle theft policies (VTP), GAP 
insurance and Dealer Documentary Service Fees because there was no abuse of discretion. 
This Court should remand the case for further proceedings on the merits and 
resolution as provided in Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this day of August, 2009. 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
JACKC.HELGESEN 
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ 
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